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ABSTRACT: Recent natural and man-made disasters highlight that a more resilient approach to pre-
paring for and dealing with such events is needed. To address this challenge, the main objective of the 
research and innovation H2020 project DARWIN is the development of European resilience management 
guidelines for Critical Infrastructures (CI). Based on a systematic literature survey with a world-wide 
scope and prioritization of resilience concepts, the guidelines have been developed taking into account 
everyday operations, contingency plans, training, etc. This paper describes insights gained from the 
adaptation of these guidelines in the domains of Air Traffic Management (ATM) and Healthcare (HC). 
A collaborative and iterative process has been defined involving relevant experts and practitioners. To 
ensure transnational, cross-sector applicability and uptake, a Community of Crisis and Resilience Prac-
titioners (DARWIN DCoP) has been involved. The preliminary results indicate that a big step has been 
taken in moving from the resilience theory to practice.
organization in the creation, assessment or 
improvement of its own reference guidelines, pro-
cedures and practices.
What is really important is that DARWIN 
results are useful for our end users namely the 
Critical Infrastructures that include ATM and 
HC.
For this purpose, the DARWIN Resilience 
management guidelines are designed to address 
disruptions, changes and opportunities; facilitate 
anticipation, adaptation, flexibility; and provide a 
foundation for an effective crisis response (Adini 
et al., 2017).
An initial set of generic DRMG was produced 
(DARWIN D2.1, 2016) and then adapted to ATM 
and HC to make the guidelines more operational 
and usable in these domains.
This paper presents the approach and meth-
odology carried out to adapt the DRMG to both 
domains and discusses relevant results.
1 INTRODUCTION
ATM and HC have a great track record of safe opera-
tions in challenging conditions, even if disruptions or 
occasional crises may happen routinely. While it can 
certainly be improved, both domains have already 
implemented a number of practices and methods, 
especially related to being able to handle such disrup-
tions or to learning from them. Still, recent examples 
from disasters are reminders of the urgent need to 
improve our ability to reveal, assess and manage 
resilience, both in everyday operations and during 
crises (Hollnagel et al., 2011, Adini et al, 2017).
The overall objective and main result of the 
Horizon 2020 EC project DARWIN is the devel-
opment of European resilience management 
guidelines. These guidelines are called DARWIN 
Resilience Management Guidelines (DRMG).
The DRMG consist of suggested interven-
tions and guiding principles to help or advise any 
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1.1 Nature of the DARWIN guidelines
The methodology to obtain the list of DRMG has 
been thoroughly defined: based on a world-wide 
systematic literature review carried out for the 
DARWIN project (DARWIN D1.1), 56 concepts, 
approaches and practices have been identified and 
evaluated (DARWIN D1.2).
The results of an evaluation following a modi-
fied Delphi process with practitioners and experts 
resulted in essential and important resilience 
concepts to be included in the resilience manage-
ment guidelines. These conceptual as well as user 
requirements are input for the development of the 
DRMG (DARWIN D1.3).
The guidelines are developed as individual 
topics that address the conceptual requirements 
identified. Those topics are referred to as Con-
cept Cards (CC). CCs propose interventions that 
organizations can implement (the how) to reach 
the resilience management capabilities captured in 
the conceptual requirements (the what). Through 
those interventions, the guidelines aim to help CI 
organizations in developing a critical view of their 
own crisis management activities (management of 
resources, procedures, training, etc.). The CC are 
structured in content blocks that contain infor-
mation such as: purpose; interventions proposed; 
actors in charge; illustration; associated practices, 
methods and tools; etc. In addition, while they 
address specific aspects of resilience management, 
CCs are not independent and links between them 
are captured through various means.
DARWIN CCs, and in particular adapted CCs, 
could be complementary to guidelines, procedures 
and practices already present in the organiza-
tions of the two domains, fostering their revision, 
improvement or even creation of new guidelines.
Also, each CC includes a Minimum Viable 
Product (MVP) which is the smallest way to 
start using the interventions proposed in the CC. 
The MVP is the set of  minimum set of  features 
required to test or experiment a solution. Its pur-
pose is to get through the “build-measure-learn” 
feedback cycle as quickly and efficiently as pos-
sible (Ries, 2011). The DARWIN project pro-
posed this solution based on interactions with 
experts (managers and front-line operations). 
This approach contrasts the traditional product 
development of  designing, performing prelimi-
nary and critical reviews, producing and testing 
and perfecting the product.
1.2 Content of the DARWIN guidelines
The DARWIN CCs are organized under the fol-
lowing themes:
Supporting coordination and Synchroniza-
tion of diStributed operationS
1. Promoting common ground in cross-organiza-
tional collaboration
2. Establishing networks for promoting inter-or-
ganizational collaboration
3. Ensuring that actors involved in resilience man-
agement have a clear understanding of their 
responsibilities and the responsibilities of other 
involved actors
Managing adaptive capacity
4. Enhancing the capacity to adapt to both 
expected and unexpected situations
5. Establishing the capacity for adapting during 
crises and other events that challenge normal 
plans and procedures
aSSeSSing reSilience
6. Identifying sources of resilience
7. Noticing brittleness
8. Assessing community resilience to understand 
and develop its capacity to manage crises
developing and reviSing procedureS and 
checkliStS
9.  Managing policies involving systematically—
policy makers and operational personnel for 
dealing with emergencies and disruptions
involving the public in reSilience management
10.  Interacting with the public not yet affected by 
or involved in a crisis
2 METHODOLOGY
The established methodology is a systematic step 
by step approach strictly intertwined with the other 
DARWN activities. These include in particular those 
relevant to the development of generic guidelines, to 
their evaluation and to interaction with the DCoP.
The adaptation process consists of two main 
steps:
-	 Step 1: Selection of adaptable CCs, i.e. the assess-
ment for the adaptability of the generic CCs
-	 Step 2: Adaptation of adaptable CCs, that is 
the adaptation of the generic CCs to ATM and 
HC domains, and the release of the adapted 
guidelines.
2.1 Selection of adaptable CCs
This phase has been performed by applying a 
methodology based on a quantitative and qualita-
tive SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities 
and Threats) analysis that assessed if  a CC was 
adaptable or not.
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The SWOT analysis methodology is commonly 
used to develop a deep understanding of all kinds 
of situations in business, organizations, and for 
individuals, to support the decision-making process.
It is noteworthy that the SWOT analysis find-
ings address relevant actions for Guidelines devel-
opers concerning the improvement of the generic 
guideline content also. In particular, during the 
development of DRMG, the CCs were simultane-
ously assessed with regard to a possible adaptation 
to the specific domains, possibly avoiding any gaps 
between development and later adaptation.
At the end of the adaptability assessment two 
lists are expected: the list of non-adaptable CCs 
including the rationale behind their non-adaptability 
or elements that can be improved, and the list of 
adaptable CCs including the rationale behind their 
adaptability.
The applied SWOT analysis has been defined 
combining the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches for a richer collection of data.
The quantitative SWOT analysis has been based 
on the definition of a set of Indicators (I) that were 
identified starting from the fields of the CC used 
for the process of adaptation.
Seventeen indicators (Table 2) have been estab-
lished, each of them formulated as a specific state-
ment and categorized according to the four areas 
of the SWOT:
-	 the Strength/Weakness (S/W) areas include indi-
cators concerning internal aspects of the CC (i.e. 
specific contents of the CC fields).
-	 the Opportunity/Threat (O/T) areas include 
indicators whose assessment needs to take into 
account a more long-term perspective and the 
Table 1. Step 1 overview.
Input
Last available version of Generic 
CCs
Output • List of Adaptable and non-
Adaptable CCs
• Information concerning content 
for CCs adaptation (from  
qualitative SWOT
• Information concerning elements 
of the Generic CC improvement
Effort
Required
• 1-day per each interview with 
each ATM/HC expert  
concerning each single CC SWOT
• 3–4 days (per CC) to organize 
relevant information and  
perform additional research
• 1 day to review the results with 
involved expert
interdependency with external factors linked to 
the contexts of the CC application.
Experts’ opinions on the indicators have subse-
quently been collected through seventeen questions 
formulated as follows “How much do you agree with 
the following statement (I_01, I_02, … I_17)?”
The answers to each question were recorded 
using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Disa-
gree” to “Very Strongly Agree”, with “Somewhat 
agree” in the middle.
In order to obtain a quantitative figure for 
each indicator’s assessment, a numeric value was 
assigned to each level of the scale, starting from 
1 (=“Disagree”) to 5 (=“Very Strongly Agree”) and 
incrementing by one per level.
Thus, according to the I mean value, the assess-
ment of each I has been classified according to the 
criteria described below.
The qualitative SWOT analysis of each generic 
CC was carried out by collecting comments and 
feedback from experts during the assessment of 
the quantitative SWOT analysis indicators.
After the quantitative assessment of each indi-
cator, the expert was asked to explain the rationale 
of the scoring, indicator by indicator, while the 
interviewer was taking notes.
The interview started with the narration of the 
illustrative case or lesson learnt that, according to 
the expert, better supports the discussion on the 
contents of the specific CC applied to the domain.
The rationales provided during the interviews 
have been collected and grouped into four areas of 
the SWOT on the basis of the mean values calcu-
lated for each indicator (ref. Table 2).
It is noteworthy that also the rationales fully 
contrasting the average evaluation for the specific 
indicator have been kept and taken into account 
for the sake of richness of data.
In addition to the CCs adaptability assessment, 
the qualitative SWOT analysis results have been 
considered as one of the main sources of informa-
tion used to adapt the CCs’ content to the specific 
domain. Moreover, the collected information has 
been enriched using sources of information avail-
able online.
Some criteria were established to evaluate the 
adaptability of each CC to the specific domain. 
They were based on two mean scores of the SWOT 
analysis results:
-	 I-02 mean score—This indicator directly refers 
to the applicability of the CC to the local con-
text in which the card will be used. The applica-
bility is the condition sine qua non the CC can be 
used in real ATM/HC environment.
-	 Total mean score of all CC indicators—This value 
provides a synthetic measure of the “adequacy” 
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and maturity of the CC fields for the adaptation 
purposes.
The combination of these two mean scores—as 
explained in Figure 1 - defines the adaptability of 
each CC and specific issues to be addressed by CC 
developers.
Figure  1, Table  4  show the criteria applied 
to establish if  a CC is adaptable or not, and the 
actions identified to handle the issue with guide-
line developers.
2.2 Adaptation of adaptable CCs
Once a CC has been evaluated as adaptable, the 
second step of the adaptation process begins. The 
Adapted CCs have been developed by integrating 
several sources:
-	 The findings of the qualitative SWOT analysis 
performed in Step 1;
-	 The information collected during ad-hoc inter-
views with domain specific experts;
Table 2. List of SWOT indicators
Nr. Statement
 1 The CC overlaps with other CCs
SWOT category: S/W
 2 The CC is applicable to local ATM/HC contexts (where the card will be used)
SWOT category: O/T
 3 The CC can be complementary to local ATM/HC arte-facts (i.e. procedures, regulations)
SWOT category: O/T
 4 Actors, as described in the CC, are identifiable in the ATM/HC domain
SWOT category: S/W
 5 The roles and responsibilities of the actors, as described in the CC, are clear in the 
ATM/HC domain
SWOT category: S/W
 6 It is possible to identify actors, roles and responsibilities, as described in the CC, in case of 
sudden changes in the ATM/HC domain (i.e. regulatory bodies, etc.)
SWOT category: O/T
 7 It is possible to identify actors, roles and responsibilities, as described in the CC, in case of 
future changes in the ATM/HC domain (i.e. regulatory bodies, etc.) 
SWOT category: O/T
 8 The implementation before, as developed in the CC, is rel-evant for the ATM/HC domain and adaptable
SWOT category: S/W
 9 The implementation during, as developed in the CC, is relevant for the ATM/HC domain and adaptable
SWOT category: S/W
10 The implementation after, as developed in the CC, is rele-vant for the ATM/HC domain and adaptable
SWOT category: S/W
11 Internal factors of the ATM/HC domain, facilitating or hindering the implementation of the 
contents of the CC, can be easily identified and explained
SWOT category: O/T
12 External factors (cultural, social, economic environment), facilitating or hindering the 
implementation of the contents of the CC, can be easily identified and explained
SWOT category: O/T
13 Expected results, that can be inferred from the CC, can be identified and explained within the 
ATM/HC domain
SWOT category: S/W
14 Illustrative cases and/or lessons learnt, linked to the con-tents of the CC, are available in 
ATM/HC domain
SWOT category: S/W
15 Practices, linked to the contents of the CC, are available in ATM/HC domain
SWOT category: S/W
16 Methods, linked to the contents of the CC, are available in ATM/HC domain
SWOT category: S/W
17 Tools, linked to the contents of the CC, are available in ATM/HC domain
SWOT category: S/W
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-	 The information provided by the domain spe-
cific experts involved in the “initial evaluation of 
guidelines”;
-	 The feedback provided by the DCoP during the 
workshop;
-	 The results collected during the implementation 
of Pilot exercises.
A strategic selection of participants from manage-
ment as well as front line operators was performed. 
A template was prepared to follow a semi-structured 
interview with experts. The interview started with a 
narration of an illustrative case to better support the 
discussion of the context of the CC.
The topics covered concern actors involved, 
actions prior to, during and after the crisis. The 
template also includes context information, prac-
tices, methods and tools as well as other illustrative 
cases. The relevance of the content proposed by the 
CC, in particular concerning the interventions, was 
discussed.
3 RESULTS ON THE SELECTION OF 
ADAPTABLE CC
The adaptability assessment of the CCs has been 
gradually carried out during the development 
process of the generic CCs.
Figure 1. Adaptability Criteria.
Table 4. Rationale for CC classification (example).
CC
Classific. “Non-adaptable” or “Partially adaptable”
Rationale • the concept is valid at a general level but 
difficult to adapt. It is not applicable in  
the local ATM/HC domain (i.e. due to  
type of organization and current policies 
of the local ATM/HC systems); or
• the CC is not adequately developed to 
be adapted; or
• so far, it has been particularly difficult 
to find specific ATM/HC content for  
the majority of the fields.
Action Major amendments are needed and the  
issue has to be discussed with  
guideline developers
CC
Classific. “Adaptable”
Rationale • the CC is applicable in the local 
ATM/HC domain; or
• most of fields of the CC are adequately 
developed. However, in some cases  
some effort could be needed to make  
adjustments or to find specific ATM/HC 
content for some fields.
Action The CC can be adapted and some issues to  
be discussed with guidelines developers
Table 3. Criteria for the classification of SWOT results.
Indicator  
mean score Classification of the Indicator I
I > 3 I classified as Strength or Opportunity
The indicator is helpful to the CC  
adaptation to the ATM/HC domain
I < 3 I classified as Weakness or Threat
The indicator is “harmful” to the CC 
adaptation to the ATM/HC domain
I = 3 Those Indicators whose mean value  
was =3 have been classified by taking 
into account the experts’ comments  
collected by the qualitative SWOT  
analysis:
• the Indicator has been classified as 
Strength or Opportunity if  the  
majority of the comments mainly  
emphasized positive elements;
• the Indicator has been classified as 
Weakness or Threat if  the majority  
of comments highlighted lacks and  
missingpoints.
Table 5. Step 2 overview.
Input • Last available version of Generic CCs
• Output from Step 1:
 – List of Adaptable CCs 
 –  Information concerning content for  
adaptation of CCs (from qualitative  
SWOT)
Output DRMG/Adapted CCs to ATM/HC
Effort
Required
• 1 day (per CC) to interview one/two 
ATM/HC expert/s;
• 5 days (per CC) to integrate Wiki with 
relevant information coming from SWOT, 
expert interviews, DCoP feedback, CC  
evaluations, feedback from pilots,  
additional research on internet.
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The SWOT analysis started as soon as the 
generic guidelines developers team considered the 
CC mature enough to be released and assessed for 
adaptation.
The information collected during the SWOT 
has been enriched using sources of information, 
suggested by the interviewee, available online and 
integrated in the DARWIN Wiki.
Overall review of expert feedback has provided 
guidance in terms of quality of the adaptable 
guidelines. It has been taken into consideration 
when updating the adaptable CC as well when 
elaborating new CCs.
Elements that have been mostly appreciated 
among experts are:
-	 The concepts developed by the CCs are relevant 
to the ATM and HC context,
-	 Actors in ATM and HC context are identifiable 
in a clear and concise manner; also roles and 
responsibilities are clear, being hierarchy well 
defined in ATM and HC,
-	 The list of actions/interventions give sufficient 
explanation of responsibilities making it easier 
to adapt to the ATM, and to HC, while taking 
into account the broader and different fields of 
HC,
-	 The triggering questions are useful and well 
grouped,
-	 The indications provided in the fields “imple-
mentation before/during/after” are sufficient 
to develop a CC adapted to the ATM and HC 
context,
-	 The level of provided information makes it eas-
ier to be integrated with local artefacts (proce-
dures, plans),
-	 Useful examples, illustrative cases, practices 
and methods are available in the ATM and HC 
context.
Elements that need improvement:
-	 In some CCs, the information is very high 
level or too generic thus making it difficult to 
adapt,
-	 Some content concerning the “Triggering Ques-
tions” and “Actions” is redundant and needs to 
be simplified,
-	 No tools are provided in some of  the current 
version of  the CCs, thus, during the adaptation 
process, efforts should be spent, accordingly,
-	 Harmonization still needs to be reached among 
some CCs.
4 RESULTS FROM ADAPTATION OF CC
At first sight, ATM and HC seem to be very differ-
ent contexts, but during meetings, the DARWIN 
team has discovered that they share many similari-
ties and many common issues (i.e. criticalities of 
the infrastructures, impact on the public, etc.).
Notwithstanding that, the aviation domain in 
general is characterized by high level of standardi-
zation. The number of standards and regulations 
guarantee that ATM has a great track record of 
safe operations.
Regulatory bodies and concerned actors are well 
defined together with roles and responsibilities.
For example, the geographical limitation of 
an aerodrome makes this type of environment 
exposed to a relatively limited number of crisis 
types (e.g., aircraft accident during take-off  or 
landing, disaster in the premises, loss of working 
resources, climatic event, etc.).
Although it is impossible to know when the cri-
sis will occur, the characteristics and dynamics of 
crisis situations can be foreseen in advance to some 
degree. As a consequence, the concerned actors 
and the response procedures can be defined with 
sufficient accuracy before the crisis occurs.
On the other hand, other types of crises in ATM 
may be much more extended from a geographical 
point of view and less predictable in the way they 
evolve (as in the example of the Eyjafjallajökull 
volcano eruption in 2010).
As previously suggested, the HC domain exhib-
its common aspects with ATM that deals with criti-
calities and brittleness, and, in addition, they share 
the same scientific basis on which public health and 
HC tasks (i.e. care, surveillance, research, regula-
tion and control) that are the same bases/criteria 
of Safety and Quality Assurance present in ATM.
What is, however, peculiar to HC is the individ-
ual/team resilience that HC workers (professional 
and operators) practice daily while performing their 
task and while coping with unexpected situations. In 
this case, the management of this resilient approach, 
i.e. systematically creating the conditions to bridge 
the gap between work-as-imagined and work-as-done 
(WAI vs. WAD), proves to be challenging.
Other relevant aspects include that this domain 
shows more complexity, and a variety of tasks, 
with many actors, ranging from surgeons to 
nurses, from regulatory bodies, providers, training 
organizations. These lead to an variety of  systems, 
processes and outputs (protocols, documents, or 
records that could differ from hospital to hospital.
HC moves to innovation, however it should 
be recalled how professionals frequently support 
clinical decisions over standardization (a clinician 
sometimes stands on autonomous judgement pro-
vided for it is based on knowledge and belief).
One of the noteworthy outcomes of the adapta-
tion process is that we discovered more uses than 
we expected at the beginning of the project. We 
found out that the guidelines are useful, they can 
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be adapted and adopted in many occasions such as 
training, workshops and meetings.
They help to start discussions and to deal with 
significant topics and they can be used to:
1. Check or update current procedures and guide-
lines, if  already existing;
2. Define new procedures and guidelines if  not 
existing;
3. Identify possible indicators and evaluation of 
trends (to do possible benchmarking);
4. Prepare plans;
5. Perform risk assessment and management.
During the interviews with ATM and HC 
experts concerning the CCs, some common aspects 
that play an important role in the resilient manage-
ment of crisis emerged:
-	 the ccS Should concern all levelS of 
organization
Even if, at first sight, the DARWIN CCs may 
address only policy makers and management, 
being responsible for the modification of cur-
rent procedures, it is noteworthy that all concepts 
address all levels of organization starting from sen-
ior management to front line operators.
-	 the roleS and reSponSibilitieS of involved 
actorS change according to the type of criSiS 
and the related environment of operationS
In the ATM context, according to the type of 
crisis several actors are involved. According to 
‘ICAO Annex 14. Emergency and other services’, 
An Airport Emergency Plan shall be established 
to coordinate the response and participation of all 
existing agencies which could assist in responding 
to an emergency.
Examples of possible agencies ON and OFF 
aerodrome are provided:
ON-aerodrome: air traffic control unit, rescue 
and firefighting services, aerodrome administra-
tion, medical and ambulance services, aircraft 
operators, security services, and police;
OFF-aerodrome: fire departments, police, health 
authorities (including medical, ambulance, hospi-
tal and public health services), military, and har-
bour patrol or coast guard.
-	 the eStabliShment of JuSt culture and Safety 
culture in all organizationS
With particular reference to the concept of “notic-
ing brittleness”, Just Culture and Safety Culture 
are the internal factors that could help in facili-
tating the identification of brittleness in each 
organization.
The concept of ‘Just culture’ is discussed in 
EUROCONTROL (2006) “in recent years the con-
cept of “Just culture” has become better understood 
and accepted by people employed in the aviation indus-
try. However […] the need for a “just culture” is gen-
erally not understood by many legislators and therefore 
not accepted within their State judicial systems.”
This issue causes “increased fear of sanctions 
against the reporter, particularly if partly or fully 
responsible for the reported occurrence.”
“Furthermore, certain elements of the media may 
deal aggressively with apparent breaches of flight 
safety within certain airlines and ANSPs.”
“These factors—punishing Air Traffic Control-
lers or pilots with fines or license suspension—may 
have the cumulative effect of reducing the level of 
incident reporting and the sharing of safety infor-
mation. This hinders safety improvement and as a 
cascading effect resilience.”
There could be concerns about possible misuse 
of information regarding brittleness in the organi-
zations, since “one of the major problems with 
collecting and analysing information is that such 
information can be a very powerful tool and, like any 
powerful tool, if used properly it will provide great 
benefit. However, it can also be used improperly and 
if that occurs considerable harm can be caused”.
In the last decade, many progresses have been 
made to encourage Just Culture in the European 
ATM context, mainly thanks to the efforts of 
EUROCONTROL: e.g. Air Navigation Service 
Providers are endorsing Just Culture policies and 
programmes, Task Forces have been created to pro-
mote, debate and discuss issues concerning safety 
and justice, meetings are organized to encourage 
interaction between safety and the judicial experts; 
special “just culture” courses for aviation experts 
and prosecutors have been organized, etc.
According to EUROCONTROL (2008), Safety 
Culture is “the way safety is perceived, valued and 
prioritised in an organization. It reflects the real 
commitment to safety at all levels in the organiza-
tion. […] It is not something you get or buy; it is 
something an organisation has. […] It can therefore 
be positive, negative or neutral.”
Since 2006, there is an active involvement 
of  EUROCONTROL, in collaboration with 
FAA and CANSO, in measuring and improv-
ing Safety Culture within ANSP organiza-
tions. Safety Culture surveys are continuously 
planned and performed, results and recom-
mendations are taken into account and imple-
mented to guarantee an effective SMS and a 
healthy Safety Culture.
-	 the importance of planning, training and 
teSting in advance
The plan should include a clear definition of the 
agencies involved, the responsibility  and role  of 
each agency and the coordinates of offices/peo-
ple to be contacted in case of emergency.
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The training of  the people allows to maintain 
the high level of preparedness for possible crisis 
events.
The test of  the plan could be done in many dif-
ferent ways beginning with the organization of 
exercises, from a lower level to a higher level, with 
each one building on the concepts of the previous: 
discussion-based and operations-based exercises. 
The execution of the exercises allows to identify 
weaknesses in the plans and possibly improve 
them.
Discussion-based exercises are organized to 
discuss the plans for upcoming operations-based 
exercises, and to make everyone familiar with roles, 
procedures and responsibilities. They include: sem-
inars, workshops, tabletop exercises, and games.
Operations-based exercises are used to validate 
and test plans and procedures that have been con-
solidated after the discussion-based exercises. They 
allow to better clarify roles and responsibilities of 
involved actors, identify gaps and limitations of the 
plan, and improve everyone’s performance. They 
include drills, functional and full-scale exercises.
-	 the importance of leSSon learned 
diSSemination
The importance of the dissemination of the rel-
evant information after the crisis events is funda-
mental in order to improve the resilience of the 
organization during crisis. In the ATM context 
and for this particular purpose, EUROCON-
TROL encourages the lesson learnt distribution 
and exchange of best practices though the website 
Skybrary. As well, the magazine Hindsight con-
tains lot of useful case studies and provides the Air 
Traffic Controllers (ATCo) with a means to share 
their experiences concerning ATM-related safety 
occurrences. The objective is to “broaden ATCOs 
understanding of the problems that may be encoun-
tered, learn more about possible solutions and be 
better prepared in the face of similar occurrences.”
Moreover, the presence of the “triggering ques-
tions” was particularly appreciated even if  it may 
be difficult to use them during time-critical types 
of crisis as a checklist to be read step-by-step and 
to identify someone that checks their completion. 
On the other hand, it is important that all the 
actors involved in the management of the crisis are 
fully aware of the topics addressed.
For crises developing over a longer time (e.g. 
Icelandic volcano eruption or Ebola outbreak) it 
is possible to organize workshops and meetings to 
reflect with other colleagues on the possible sources 
of brittleness and use the triggering questions to 
support the reflection. The same approach can be 
used during a drill or a simulation by a facilitator 
to guide the simulation and stimulate participants 
to notice brittleness.
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The work performed so far confirms the intended 
readership as policy makers, front line operators, 
resilience engineering managers, crisis managers, 
critical infrastructures managers, methodologists, 
community of practice in ATM and HC. Stake-
holders such as managers and policy makers can 
use this work as source of inspiration when adapt-
ing resilience guidelines to their domains.
In particular, applying the DARWIN resilience 
concepts, triggering questions, methods and tools, 
they will be able to:
-	 Apply the proposed interventions provided in 
the CCs to survey current practices, strategies, 
procedures and guidelines;
-	 Start to reflect on “what went well” and not only 
“what went wrong” when learning from events;
-	 Assess the effectiveness of roles and responsi-
bilities during a crisis;
-	 Revise and/or define common action plans 
through periodical coordination activities and 
training;
-	 Identify brittleness in the system and the appli-
cation of procedures and response to the crisis;
-	 Get to know practices, methods and tools 
applied by others;
-	 Test and improve their plan of communication 
with public during emergencies.
The collaborative method presented in this 
paper illustrates an iterative approach that brings 
theoretical concepts close to their practical imple-
mentation. We gathered information from other 
domains through workshops with members of the 
DCoP. The SWOT facilitated translation of resil-
ience concepts into practical interventions. The 
methodologies proposed to adapt the concepts are 
defined in detail to ensure other concepts to be 
included in the future. The participation of experts 
is essential to ensure applicability, relate to the spe-
cific domain as well as enrich the cards with exist-
ing practices and methods.
At the beginning of the work, we planned sepa-
rate guidelines for ATM and HC. The first results 
were cards that replicated the generic cards. This 
overlap in relevance and adaptation in CCs out-
come in ATM and HC indicate the potential of the 
generic CCs to be applicable to other sectors. The 
current result combines generic fields with adap-
tations to HC and ATM as required. The results 
indicate the possibilities of similar adaptations to 
other domains.
A challenge is the achievement of consensus 
on the review process and iteration to achieve suf-
ficient maturity. Another challenge as well as an 
opportunity is to merge different cultural perspec-
tives across Europe when dealing with crises. We 
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found this as a window of opportunity to learn 
mapping recommended practices and methods 
within and across domains.
Further work includes evaluation of DRMG 
and associated CCs in relevant operational scenar-
ios. We consider collecting feedback from ATM, 
HC as well as other domains from the DCoP.
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